The International Legal Responsibility To protect Against Genocide, War Crimes And Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty Does Not Preclude Its Exercise by Aronofsky, David
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT AGAINST GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: WHY
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE
ITS EXERCISE
David Aronofsky"
Good morning everyone. I am pleased to be here as part of this exciting
International Law Weekend to participate with my good friend and Rocky
Mountains colleague, Professor Nanda, along with Professor Wojcik, to discuss
this important topic of The Responsibility to Protect Victims of Genocide, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. I have four main points. First, I believe
international law imposes a legal duty and responsibility on all nations, as well
as the UN Security Council, to protect these victims and prevent such atrocities.
Second, I do not believe national sovereignty bars the exercise of this duty and
responsibility even when the Security Council fails to authorize such action, in
appropriate circumstances. Third, the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has defined such circumstances with enough
clarity for states to act, unilaterally if necessary, and multilaterally otherwise.
Fourth, this duty must be exercised effectively by any and all means designed
to achieve success, rather than with symbolic gestures having no chance of
success and likely to exacerbate tragedy. Let me now address each of these
points more fully.
The duty and responsibility to protect targeted victims of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and indeed, to prevent these atrocities
from occurring, can be found in multiple international law instruments
explicitly or by reasonable inference. The several Geneva Conventions, the
Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights plus various
regional human rights conventions, and the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights all recognize the rights of innocent people to be free from
atrocities conducted either in armed conflicts, or under more covert
circumstances where states lend support to unofficial illegal acts or, at times,
are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from their occurrence.
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Without effective military intervention by states willing and able to enforce
these rights, however, the rights themselves become meaningless. I refuse to
believe proponents of these instruments, which form the bedrock of today's
international law, intended them to be meaningless. The UN General Assembly
addressed this issue directly in Resolution 3074, Paragraph 3 requiring states
to "co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis with a view
to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity" and
obligating states to "take the domestic and international measures necessary for
that purpose."' More recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1674 adopted
April 28, 2006 expressly recognized a legal responsibility to protect civilians
in times of conflict.2  Resolution 1674 reflects a major international law
breakthrough regarding the protection duty principle.
As to my second point, I do not see national sovereignty as a barrier to
protective intervention because in my view, states effectively waive their
national sovereignty when they commit, facilitate the commission of, or fail to
protect their populations against atrocities. Those interested in reviewing the
legal pros and cons of humanitarian intervention undertaken to protect
populations from atrocities should read Professor Rogers' excellent analysis.4
I have formed my own opinion on this issue and join those who favor
intervention at the expense of sovereignty. Can anyone seriously make a
credible legal case for defending Sudanese national sovereignty to allow Darfur
murders and ethnic cleansing?
Last Spring, I participated with Professor Nanda in a Rocky Mountain anti-
genocide conference focusing heavily on Darfur, and as various speakers there
pointed out, Darfur atrocities have continued all but unabated for at least 30
years. I recall working on a Darfur-related refugee case in my own law practice
about 20 years ago. In my view no legitimate sovereign permits or commits this
kind of prolonged systemic international law violation, nor should any
sovereign be allowed to do so. Professor King, and also this ILSA Journal, have
aptly written that since the Nuremberg Principles, states in these circumstances
effectively waive sovereignty as a defense against intervention.5
1. G.A. Res. 3074, 3, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 3, 1973).
2. See generally S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
3. Id.
4. See generally A.P.V. Rogers, Symposium: The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Situations: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 HARv. J. L & PUB. POL'Y 725 (2004).
5. See generally Henry T. King, Jr., Address: Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CAsE W. RES. J.
INT'L. 135 (1996). See generally Mitchell A. Meyers, Note & Comment, A Defense of Unilateral or
Multilateral Intervention Where a Violation of International Human Rights Law By a State Constitutes an
Implied Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 895 (1997).
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Kofi Annan has stated: "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to
a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend
every precept of our common humanity?"'6 I share these collective opinions.
Let me be clear that I do not favor intervention willy-nilly. I also see some
very complex legal and political situations arising from my position, including
Chechnya, and possibly even Tibet. On the other hand, ICISS has done the
international law community great service by advocating military intervention
to protect against and prevent atrocities under carefully prescribed
circumstances, and only when the UN Security Council fails to act. These
circumstances include slayings of or threats to kill large numbers of people;
large scale ethnic cleansing; crimes against humanity or war crimes which
could have caused or did cause many deaths; the collapse of a state followed by
imminent danger of starvation or civil war; or huge natural and environmental
catastrophes if a state is unwilling or unable to help and many people are
endangered or killed.7 Worth noting here is the General Assembly's 2005
adoption, in Resolution 60/1, of the ICISS work as the basis for recognizing
"the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. '
Finally, I want to emphasize the need for effective, rather than ineffective,
intervention in carrying out the duty and responsibility to protect. Professor
Nanda has mentioned this morning the inability of a viable African
peacekeeping force to be formed and placed on the ground in Darfur, and
meanwhile the killings there continue. Bosnia and Rwanda witnessed great
tragedies caused by the ineffective presence of NATO and UN troops unwilling
or unable to protect civilian populations, when innocent victims relied on the
presence of these troops to congregate in groups around them only to find
themselves in harm's way. I stress here that once a decision is made to enter
a strife-ridden place to protect lives, it must be done right to avoid compound-
ing the atrocities. Time does not permit discussing here how effective
intervention can be done. I nonetheless note that international intervention
treaties by participating states, as contemplated in General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3074, offer potentially successful legal mechanisms in this regard.9
Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
6. The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First
Century, ch. 4, at 48, U.N. Doc. No. A/54/2000 (Apr. 3,2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/
sg/report/fuIll.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
7. See THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMM'N ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Sept. 21, 2001).
8. G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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